Intertemporal Evaluation Criteria for Climate Change Policy: Basic Ethical Issues by Wolfgang Buchholz & Michael Schymura
Selection of our books indexed in the Book Citation Index 
in Web of Science™ Core Collection (BKCI)
Interested in publishing with us? 
Contact book.department@intechopen.com
Numbers displayed above are based on latest data collected. 
For more information visit www.intechopen.com
Open access books available
Countries delivered to Contributors from top 500 universities
International  authors and editors
Our authors are among the
most cited scientists
Downloads
We are IntechOpen,
the world’s leading publisher of
Open Access books
Built by scientists, for scientists
12.2%
122,000 135M
TOP 1%154
4,800
0Intertemporal Evaluation Criteria for Climate
Change Policy: Basic Ethical Issues
Wolfgang Buchholz1 and Michael Schymura2
1University of Regensburg and CESifo, Munich
2Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), Mannheim
Germany
1. Introduction
The results of cost benefit analysis crucially depend on the welfare criteria that are used to
evaluate the streams of well-being over time generated by the investment projects under
consideration. In economics and philosophy there is a long lasting and rather controversial
debate as to which type of intertemporal social welfare function and, in particular, which
social discount rate should be applied. This debate has been revitalized in the last few years
because, especially since the release of the Stern Review in 2006, it has become clear which
dramatic effect the choice of the social discount rate has on the design of climate policy. In this
context it is important to decide how costs and benefits should be shared between generations
and, in particular, to which extent the interests of future generations should be taken into
account when projects with long-run consequences are carried out. From this perspective the
choice of a specific intertemporal evaluation criterion becomes a matter of ethics, i.e. of justice
between generations.
There exist two opposing "schools" in economics which have completely different positions
concerning the importance of intergenerational ethics for intertemporal evaluation (see
Aldy et al. (2010), p.912). On the one hand there is the positive ("descriptive") school
for which ethical judgment is redundant since behavior of existing individuals and thus
empirically observable market interest rates should be the benchmark for the determination
of the social discount rate. On the other hand there is the normative ("prescriptive") school
which has its roots in classical welfare economics and for which explicitly formulated
normative criteria are of much importance. For this school an ethically oriented debate
on the properties and implications of different intertemporal evaluation criteria and their
normative foundations is essential (see Atkinson, A. (2011) for a general discussion on
the relationship between ethics and welfare economics.). In the climate change literature
arguments of both schools often are confounded which causes much misunderstanding and
makes the debate on the appropriate method for intertemporal evaluation rather opaque
(see e.g. Kaplow, L., Moyer, E. and D. A. Weisbach (2010) as some critical reflections on the
debate).
In this paper we will adopt the perspective of the normative school (see also Roemer J. (2011),
for an excellent defense of the ethical position). Our main objective then is to present the
most important ethical issues that, particularly in the context of climate policy, are relevant
for the choice of intertemporal welfare criteria. We will proceed as follows. In Section 2 we
present various classes of intertemporal social welfare functions well-known from optimal
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growth theory (i.e. maximin, undiscounted utilitarianism, discounted utilitarianism and some
recently developed hybrid criteria) and discuss which desirable and undesirable properties
they have. In Section 3 we explore whether ethical criteria can also be employed to determine
the parameter values (or at least to delimit their range) which, after the choice of some type
of intertemporal social welfare function, are needed to specify the concrete criterion by which
decisions on climate policy are made. In Section 4 we conclude and discuss some implications
our general considerations may have for climate change policy.
2. Ethically relevant properties of different types of intertemporal social welfare
functions
2.1 Preliminaries
In common with the literature we assume that ct denotes well-being in period of time t =
1, 2, . . . . Thus the vector of various determinants of well-being, i.e. material consumption,
leisure, environmental quality etc, is mapped into the real-valued indicator ct. The severe
problems of measurement and aggregation of ct are not treated in this paper
1. Purely for
terminological convenience, we identify the variable ct with consumption in period t in all that
follows. Time is discrete, with each period of time t = 1, 2, . . . representing just the lifespan
of one single generation. So generations do not overlap, and for the sake of simplification, we
suppose that population is constant over time thus neglecting the ethical aspects of population
change2. If some technology and some initial resource endowment are given there is a class
Γ of feasible consumption paths (c1, c2, . . . ) of infinite length. These consumption paths are
evaluated by an intertemporal social welfare function W(.) which is weakly monotone in all
variables and may assume values in the interval [−∞,+∞]. We now consider different types
of those social welfare functions as suggested by the literature.
2.2 Maximin
Maximin as a criterion for intertemporal evaluation dates back to Rawls’ "difference principle"
(although Rawls, J. (1971) himself did neither accept the denomination "maximin" nor
the application of this criterion in the intergenerational context). As an attempt to be
"plus Rawlsien que le Rawls" - it was Solow, R. (1974) who applied this criterion to the
Dasgupta-Heal-Solow growth model, in which the input of an exhaustible resource is
continually substituted by reproducible man-made capital. Given an infinite number of
generations the minimum level of consumption along a given consumption path may not
exist, such that the maximin social welfare function must in this case be defined as
W(c1, c2, . . . ) = inf
t=1,2,...
ct (1)
This social welfare function satisfies two commonly shared ethical objectives that play a major
role in the intergenerational context.
(i) All generations have an equal weight in social evaluation. In particular future generations
are not discriminated against simply because they have the bad luck to appear later on the
time axis. This intergenerational neutrality also means that the value of the social welfare
1 d‘Aspremont, C. and Gevers, L. (1977) offer a very comprehensive axiomatic approach towards
different social welfare functions. Roemer, J. (1996) summarizes the extensive literature and
contributions that deal with the measurability of well-being and its relevance for social welfare
comparisons.
2 We refer the reader who is interested in situations with a changing population to
Blackorby, C. , Bossert, W. and Donaldson, D. (1995).
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function (1) is not changed even if an infinite permutation of a given consumption path is
made. For a long time (see already Sidgwick, H. (1874)), equal treatment of generations has
been considered to be the basic requirement for intergenerational fairness. Maximin also
respects some albeit rather weak version of the Pareto principle: If consumption does not
decrease for any generation the new path obviously is not worse than the original one.
(ii) The maximin rule (1) implements specific non-decreasing and thus sustainable paths as
optimal solutions: Assume that there exists a strictly positive consumption level c that, for
the given technology and the given initial resource endowment, can be attained by any
generation. Then it is clearly excluded by application of (1) that some later generation’s
consumption falls below c while some earlier generation enjoys a consumption level above
c. If such a constant consumption path (c, c, . . . ) is Pareto optimal it maximizes social welfare
according to (1) among all feasible paths as in Solow, R. (1974) classical paper.
Even though the maximin rule shows these ethically appealing properties it also has some
serious disadvantages, which limit its usefulness as a criterion for dealing with intertemporal
resource allocation issues. This standard view may, however, be challenged if the economy’s
state of development is already very high and maximin does not apply to levels of material
consumption but to basic and partly non-substitutable goods as staple food or health (see
Roemer J. (2011)).
(i) Maximin does not respect more demanding versions of the Pareto criterion because it is
insensitive to increases in consumption if the minimum/infimum of consumption does not
change. In particular, the strong Pareto principle is violated, which means that any increase
of consumption along a given path should lead to a strictly preferred new path. To give an
example just consider the two consumption paths
(
1
2 ,
1
3 ,
1
4 , . . .
)
and
(
1, 23 ,
1
2 , . . .
)
. Both have
the same infimum equal to zero but the second path has a higher level of consumption than
the first one not only in one but even in each period of time. In the case of a finite number
of generations strong Pareto can be obtained by adopting the leximin criterion, but with an
infinite number of generations such an extension is neither straightforward nor does it allow
a comparison of all paths (see e.g. Asheim, G. B. (1991)).
(ii) The maximin criterion excludes any investment of an earlier generation to increase
well-being of future generations above the level enjoyed by itself - irrespective of the extent
of that increase and the number of future generations which would benefit from this sacrifice.
To give an example we start from the constant consumption path (1, 1, 1, . . . ) and assume that
the economy is so productive that the path ( 9991000 , 2, 2, . . . ) is also technically feasible. I.e. if
one single generation (the first one) makes a minor sacrifice of only 11000 units of consumption
each subsequent generation could double its level of well-being. Nevertheless, the maximin
rule deems this path inferior to the original constant consumption path. Strict application of
maximin thus condemns the economy to stagnation and precludes economic growth based
on savings and investment. It was this reason why Rawls, J. (1971) did not recommend the
difference principle for making choices in the intergenerational context.
2.3 Undiscounted utilitarianism
In his seminal paper on optimal growth theory Ramsey, F. (1928) used undiscounted
utilitarianism to evaluate and compare feasible consumption paths. This approach shares
some advantages and disadvantages with the maximin rule but has merits and shortcomings
of its own. The standard version of an undiscounted utilitarian social welfare functions reads
as
W(c1, c2, . . . ) =
∞
∑
t=1
u(ct) (2)
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where u(c) - usually defined for all consumption levels c > 0 - is a strictlymonotone increasing
utility function through which the well-being of each generation is assessed before it enters
social evaluation but which is not meant to be a felicity function in the sense of classical
utilitarianism (see Kaplow, L. (2010) and Kaplow, L., Moyer, E. and D. A. Weisbach (2010) for
this conceptual distinction). Often an isoelastic utility function given by u(c) = c
1−η
1−η (or
equivalently u(c) = c
1−η−1
1−η ) is employed where the elasticity of marginal utility η ≥ 0 (with
η = 1) indicates the degree of inequality aversion in social evaluation. For η = 1 the utility
function is defined as ln c (which is justified since limη→1 =
c1−η−1
1−η = ln c, ∀ c > 0). The main
ethical advantages of undiscounted utilitarianism are as follows:
(i) In common with the maximin rule application of an undiscounted utilitarian social
welfare function implies equal treatment of all generations and thus respects the fundamental
postulate for intergenerational justice. Welfare is not changed when the consumption levels
of a finite number of generations are permuted if, as assumed in (2), the utility function u(c) is
the same for all periods. Concerning distribution in the atemporal setting, i.e. within a society
in a certain period of time, it is quite common in welfare economics to make judgments with
unweighted sums of utility.
(ii) Undiscounted utilitarianism ensures sustainable development if the economy under
consideration is productive in an intuitive sense: If some generation makes a consumption
sacrifice to expand the economy’s capital stock then it will be possible for some later
generation to increase its consumption by more than this earlier sacrifice. Then it follows
from a general argument (see Asheim, G. B., Buchholz, W. and Tungodden, B. (2001)) that a
somewhere decreasing consumption path will never maximize a welfare function of type (2).
So it is ensured that only non-decreasing paths are selected by applying an undiscounted
utilitarian criterion. Along such paths no generation consumes more than it concedes to its
successors, which gives sustainability.
(iii) If, as is usually assumed, the utility function u(c) is concave, a rank-preserving
Pigou-Dalton transfer from a rich generation with high consumption to a poorer generation
increases aggregate welfare (2) (see in a general welfare theoretic framework Atkinson, A.
(1970)). Thus undiscounted utilitarianism is also useful to take equality of the distribution
of well-being among generations into account which, as an ethical objective, is conceptually
different from the equal treatment of generations (see Asheim, G. B. (1991)). Employing
utility functions u(c) with more or less curvature, i.e. varying the parameter η in the case
of an isoelastic utility function, makes it possible to capture different degrees of inequality
aversion in social evaluation. Then the maximin criterion is the extreme case where inequality
aversion η is infinite. Classical utilitarianism, where u(c) = c and the pure consumption levels
are summed up in (2), reflects the opposite extreme where inequality aversion is completely
absent.
On the other hand undiscounted utilitarianism has some properties which are less desirable.
(i) For any utility function u(c) the utility sum of many consumption paths will be plus or
minus infinity. Simple comparisons of the scalars obtained by (2) will not provide a ranking of
these paths. But one may readily refine the ranking somehow by using overtaking or catching
up criteria. Thus, e.g., a consumption path (ca1, c
a
2, . . . ) is strictly preferred to a consumption
path (cb1, c
b
2, . . . ) if there is a period T˜ such that for all T > T˜ the inequality
T
∑
t=1
u(cat ) >
T
∑
t=1
u(cbt ) (3)
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holds (as a pioneering contribution on this overtaking criterion see v. Weizsäcker, C. C.
(1965)). Weak preference is obtained if condition (3) is fulfilled with weak inequality ≥. For
fundamental reasons, however, one cannot further extend the partial ordering given by (3) in a
way that respects stronger versions of the Pareto principle and permits comparisons between
any two consumption paths.
(ii) While in a productive economy maximin excessively favors the present, undiscounted
utilitarianism may excessively favor the future, demanding very high savings from earlier
generations. To illustrate this, we assume that, given a strictly increasing utility function and
starting from a constant consumption path (c, c, . . . ), the consumption sacrifice s in the first
generation allows all subsequent generations to increase their consumption by some amount
ǫ > 0. Then, as long as u(c − s) > −∞, the consumption path (c − s, c + ǫ, c + ǫ, . . . )
will dominate (c, c, . . . ) irrespective of how small ǫ is. Under undiscounted utilitarianism
the infinite number of future generations thus gains some dictatorial position towards any
finite number of earlier generations. This well-known argument against undiscounted
utilitarianism (see already Chakravarty, S. (1969) and Rawls, J. (1971) and more recently
Arrow (1999) and Asheim, G. B. (2010)), however, needs some qualification as it does not
hold for any path from which saving starts. Suppose for instance that the utility function is
u(c) = −c−1 and that the initial consumption path is (1, 2, 4, 8, . . . ) which then has aggregate
welfare−2. Further assume that generation 1 saves 14 which, for a certain technology, permits
an increase of consumption of any subsequent generation by the uniform amount 110 . The new
consumption stream
(
3
4 , 2+
1
10 , 4+
1
10 , 8+
1
10 , . . .
)
=
(
3
4 ,
21
10 ,
41
10 ,
81
10 , . . .
)
is Pareto inferior to
the consumption path
(
3
4 ,
21
20 · 2,
21
20 · 4,
21
20 · 8, . . .
)
whose welfare is − 43 −
20
21 · 1 = −
48
21 <
−2. So the new path is inferior to the original one, which means that the investment of
generation 1 does not improve welfare even though all generations from generation 2 on
benefit from an equal increase of consumption. If saving of generation 1 exceeded 12 then
any increase in future consumption along the given initial path would not be sufficient to
restore welfare to its original level. Therefore, if we do not start from a constant, but from a
strictly monotone increasing consumption path, undiscounted utilitarianism is able to prevent
excessive saving and to restrict the rate of growth to an ethically acceptable degree (see
Asheim, G. B. and Buchholz, W. (2003) for a further elaboration of this argument).
2.4 Discounted utilitarianism
Most frequently intertemporal evaluation is performed using discounted utilitarian social
welfare functions which give utility of future generations less weight than utility of earlier
ones. This type of social welfare functions is defined by
W(c1, c2, . . . ) =
∞
∑
t=1
δtu(ct) (4)
In (4) the function u(ct) again represents utility of consumption and (δt)t=1,2,... is a
non-increasing sequence of utility discount factors with ∑∞t=1 δt < ∞. These utility discount
factors indicate how much utility in period t counts in terms of period 1 such that naturally
δ1 = 1. Traditionally, (δt)t=1,2,... is assumed to fall geometrically, i.e. δt = δ
t−1 where δ = 11+ρ
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and ρ ≥ 0 is the constant discount or time preference rate3. If δ = 1 all generations are treated
equally, and undiscounted utilitarianism is obtained as a special case of (4).
Discounted utilitarianism has several desirable properties.
(i) For consumption paths that are strictly bounded away from zero and bounded above social
welfare according to (4) is a well-defined scalar such that a complete ordering is obtained in an
obvious way. Completeness is an attractive feature if one shares the view that a rational ethical
observer should always be able to decide whether one of two arbitrarily given consumption
paths is better than the other (or whether they are equivalent). But it may be questioned how
important completeness really is, i.e. whether "incompleteness (is) such a defect of an ethical
theory" (Roemer J. (2011), p. 370). So if the task is to choose a best element out of a class of
technically feasible consumption paths one may be content with finding paths that dominate
all other paths for a solely partial ordering, as e.g. the overtaking criterion considered above.
Reducing demands on intertemporal evaluation criteria to a more modest level also reflects
the view that it normally is quite unlikely that a single criterion integrates all properties that
are normatively desirable. This problem is especially important in the case of infinitely many
agents/generations. Since Diamond, P. (1965) thus impossibility results, which show the
incompatibility of different plausible postulates, abound in the literature on intertemporal
evaluation4 . In particular, it has been shown that a social ordering which fulfils the equal
treatment postulate and the strong Pareto principle cannot be represented by a cardinal social
welfare function when there is an infinite number of generations (see Basu, K. and Mitra, T.
(2003)). Nevertheless, having a numerical welfare measurement makes the determination of
optimal consumption paths simpler and more transparent, which - from a purely technical
viewpoint - is a non-negligible advantage of discounted utilitarianism. But it is questionable
whether this argument can claim much ethical significance.
(ii) Applying a discounted utilitarian criterion is held to be an appropriate safeguard to avoid
excessive savings and overburdening of earlier generations. This is particularly clear if, as
in the example of the previous section, we start from a constant consumption path and any
generation t = 2, 3, . . . has an equal increase in consumption ǫ when the first generation
saves some amount s. Then given ∑∞t=1 δt < ∞, the level of a welfare-improving investment
in period 1 naturally is restricted by sˆ = (∑∞t=1 δt) ǫ which protects generation 1. But, as
explained above, along non-constant consumption paths the same effect may also be brought
about with undiscounted social welfare functions. Moreover, if the utility function and the
time discount factors are fixed, discounted utilitarianism mitigates but not necessarily avoids
excessive savings of the first generation. Wewill show this using a linear growthmodel where
the capital stock kt+1 that generation t hands over to generation t + 1 is given by kt+1 =
α(kt − ct). Here, α is a productivity parameter which is assumed to be constant over time and
which indicates the marginal rate of transformation between consumption in period t and
period t + 1. If k1 is the initially given capital stock of generation 1 then all consumption paths
(c1, c2, . . . ) are technically feasible for which
∞
∑
t=1
ct
αt−1
≤ k1 (5)
3 We emphasize this point, because there is seemingly a remaining confusion of what is being discounted
with the discount rate or the discount factor.
4 One property of social orderings which the literature concentrates on but for which an ethical
meaning is hard to detect is continuity w.r.t different topologies. See e.g. Svensson, L.-G. (1980),
Asheim, G. B. and Buchholz, W. (2003) and Roemer J. (2011) for a discussion on this. Sakai, T. (2010)
instead focuses on the compatibility between anonymity, strong Pareto and transitivity.
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holds. Just as before we now start from the Pareto optimal constant consumption path
(c, c, . . . ) (with c = α−1α k1 for given k1) and assume that generation 1 makes an additional
saving of s units of consumption. Then it directly follows from (5) that this enables any
subsequent generation to increase its consumption by ǫ = (α− 1)s units. If we now consider
the special case of an isoelastic utility function with η = 1 , i.e. u(c) = ln c, the sum of
discounted utilities flowing from saving s is
ln(c− s) +
∞
∑
t=2
δt−1 ln(c + (α− 1)s) = ln(c− s) +
δ
1− δ
ln(c + (α− 1)s) (6)
By an easy calculation it is shown that, assuming δα > 1, the level of savings which maximizes
(6) is
s∗ =
δα− 1
α− 1
c (7)
Even for quite plausible values of δ and α, as e.g. δ = 0.9 and α = 1.25, (7) implies that
generation 1 would be forced to sacrifice 45 % of its initial consumption to make future
generations better off. If the productivity parameter α goes to infinity, the level of savings
according to equation (7) converges to δc, which for a small time discount rate ρ and a high α
is close to k1. This shows that time discounting with fixed parameters ρ or equivalently δ will
not necessarily prevent overburdening of early generations independent of the underlying
technology. Concerning their ability to deal with the danger of excessive saving, the difference
between undiscounted and discounted utilitarianism thus turns out to be less fundamental
than might appear at first sight.
The first order conditions along an optimal path in the linear growth model of the previous
section are
u′(ct+1) =
1
δα
u′(ct) (8)
which for an isoelastic utility function means
ct+1 = (δα)
1
η ct. (9)
It follows from (9) that the same optimal path is obtained for different combinations of δ and η.
In particular, the optimal solution, which results for some originally given parameter values
δ and η, can also be implemented without any pure time discount, i.e. δ = 1 , by choosing a
different inequality aversion parameter η˜ given by
η˜ =
η ln α
ln α+ ln δ
. (10)
This interchangeability of δ and α in addition confirms that the gap between undiscounted
and discounted utilitarianism is less deep than usually suspected.
The ethically questionable properties of discounted utilitarianism which more or less mirror
the advantages of undiscounted utilitarianism will now be discussed.
(i) Discounted utilitarian social welfare functions do not treat all generations equally as utility
of later generations counts less than utility of earlier ones (which in the case of a finite number
of agents would be a quite unusual assumption). Thus these criteria violate the basic postulate
of intergenerational equity.
(ii) One cannot rule out the possibility that discounted utilitarianism leads to a
non-sustainable development: Along consumption paths that maximize discounted
391tertempor l Evaluation Criteria for Climate Change Policy: Basic Ethical Issues
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utilitarianwelfare (4) consumption of later generationsmay be smaller than that of earlier ones
and, moreover, consumption may go to zero in the long run (see Dasgupta, P. and Heal, G.
(1979), p.299 for the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow model). This phenomenon in general occurs if
productivity of capital is low as compared to the discount rate. So it immediately follows from
(8) that in the linear growth model consumption along an optimal is falling and converges to
0 if δα < 1 . Declining consumption is inevitable for any constant discount factor δ < 1 if,
as in the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow model with an exhaustible resource, marginal productivity
of man-made capital converges to zero while the strictly positive utility discount rate ρ is
constant. Therefore, discounted utilitarianism not only is unfair towards later generations
in the light of its normative foundations but also w.r.t. its possible consequences for the
distribution of consumption across generations.
(iii) Discounted utilitarianism may violate the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle as the
fundamental criterion for equality of distribution. This happens if the transfer goes from a
rich early generation t1 to a poor later generation t2 whenever δt1u
′(ct1 ) > δt2u
′(ct2 ). This
condition is fulfilled if
ct2
ct1
is close to one but
δt2
δt1
is rather small.
2.5 Hybrid criteria
In the recent literature on intertemporal evaluation a lot of suggestions for new
criteria have been developed to overcome some of the deficiencies of the standard
criteria. The conceptually simplest approach is to combine two criteria in order to
preserve some of the merits of both. Modifying an approach of Chichilnisky, G.
(1996), Alvarez-Cuadrado, F. and Long, N. V. (2009) have suggested some composition of
discounted utilitarianism with the maximin rule such that
W(c1, c2, . . . ) = (1−Θ)
∞
∑
t=1
δtu(ct) + Θ inf
t=1,2,...
u(ct) (11)
emerges as amixed Bentham-Rawls welfare function. Here, on the right-hand side of equation
(11) the parameter Θ indicates the relative weight which maximin has in the aggregate
criterion. A welfare function of this type makes it less likely than discounted utilitarianism
alone that early generations enjoy a large increase in their well-being while the great many of
future generations are driven into poverty. Thus a major possible shortcoming of discounted
utilitarianism can be avoided and a more equitable balance of interest between the present
and the future is achieved. But a sustainable development is not ensured in any case just
if the parameter Θ is very small (see Alvarez-Cuadrado, F. and Long, N. V. (2009)), and the
strong Pareto criterion is only fulfilled if the utility function u(c) is bounded below. This,
however, is not an innocuous assumption since inmost empirical applications isoelastic utility
functions u(c) with inequality aversion η ≥ 1 and thus limc→0 u(c) = −∞ are used (see also
the subsequent Section 3 for some justification of this). Moreover, if δ < 1, the social welfare
function does not imply equal treatment of all generations such that anonymity as the basic
postulate of intergenerational equity is also violated with mixed Bentham-Rawls criteria.
In contrast Zuber, S. and G. Asheim (2010) have devised a criterion which combines
anonymity with discounting. The idea underlying this approach is that discounting does
not depend on the period of time in which some level of consumption accrues but on the rank
which the consumption level of a generation has in the whole consumption path. A problem
with this rank-discounted utilitarianism is that, given an infinite number of generations, a
ranking of consumption levels does not exist for all consumption streams, e.g. for any strictly
decreasing path, such that additional constructions are required to extend and complete
the social ordering and to get strong Pareto. Nevertheless, rank-discounted utilitarianism
392 Climate Change – Socioeconomic Effects
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gives later generations more protection against rapacity of the earlier ones than the mixed
Bentham-Rawls welfare functions which, from the perspective of sustainability, constitutes
an important advantage. With the Asheim-Zuber criterion discounting serves as an "added
expression of aversion to inequality" (Asheim, G. B. (2011), p. 8). But some further discussion
seems to be required to justify rank-discounted utilitarianism in this respect as preferable to
undiscounted utilitarianism.
Llavador, H., Silvestre, J. and J. Roemer (2008) reject the utilitarian framework completely
and suggest a criterion in which an exogenously given constant growth rate g of well-being is
the objective that optimal paths have to fulfill. Proceeding in this unconventional way outside
traditional welfare economics the maximin rule (where g = 0) is generalized to a sustainable
growth criterion which allows for economic progress and which thus cures the major defect
of pure maximin. The question, however, is through which normative concepts the choice
of some growth target g may be motivated. Moreover, in some technological environments
as the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow model, consumption growth with any constant positive rate
is not possible which somewhat reduces the applicability of the Llavador-Silvestre-Roemer
criterion.
2.6 Some preliminary assessment
All intertemporal social welfare functions that we have discussed have their pros and
cons. Since maximin - with its exclusion of investment and economic progress - mostly
deserves primarily attention for fixing basic ideas the real choice is between undiscounted
and discounted utilitarianism. Which of these criteria is to be preferred thus is the major field
of controversy in the scientific debate. Until now we have only compared these two types of
evaluation criteria at an abstract level without saying anything about the parameter values
that are needed to specify them. In particular, appropriate levels of the degree of inequality
aversion η incorporated in the isoelastic utility function u(c) and the discount rate ρ need to
be chosen in order to make the criteria operational.
In simulation studies on climate change policy (as e.g. the DICE-model applied by
Nordhaus, W. and J. Boyer (2000) to assess the economic impacts of climate change) η and
δ are, in the tradition of the descriptive school, usually determined by calibrating numerical
growth models such that the Ramsey equation r = ηg + δ (see e.g. Dasgupta, P. and Heal, G.
(1979) or Stern, N. (2007)) is fulfilled given the empirically observed consumption growth
rate g and the real interest rate r. Proceeding this way (Nordhaus, W. (2007), p. 692) finds
"the ethical reasoning on discount rates (. . . ) largely irrelevant for the actual investments
and negotiations about climate change". But from the viewpoint of the prescriptive school
adopted here the parameter choice should also be made on the basis of normative principles.
What at least is required "is adjusting certain parameters so as to reach a conclusion more in
line with our intuitive judgements" (Rawls, J. (1971), p. 298). The possibility of determining
these parameters by ethical reflections may also have some repercussions for the acceptability
of the criteria as such. These additional, and, in contrast to the topics up to now in this paper,
less familiar ethical issues will now be dealt with.
3. Choice of parameters from a normative perspective
The degree of inequality aversion of the utility function plays a central role for the specification
of undiscounted, discounted and the hybrid criteria discussed above. The pattern of the time
discount rate is only important for discounted utilitarianism and the hybrid versions. In the
case of the mixed Bentham-Rawls criteria the weighing factor for the maximin part would
have to be determined in addition.
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3.1 Inequality aversion
The Stern Review (see Stern, N. (2007)), in contrast to much previouswork on climate change,
explicitly addressed the ethical dimension of intergenerational evaluation and in principle
adopted the equal treatment postulate for generations. Therefore, in Stern’s approach
the elasticity of marginal utility η automatically became the main tool for bringing about
an ethically acceptable balance of interest between different generations. But, somewhat
surprisingly, the highly crucial choice of η was not discussed explicitly from the ethical
viewpoint. In this context the Review’s reflections remained rather brief, and no convincing
normative justification for specifically choosing η = 1 as inequality aversion index for the
main part of the empirical study was given. At the central place of the Report (see Stern, N.
(2007), p. 184) there is only a short remark that employing η = 1 is "in line with recent
empirical estimates". Reference is made to two empirical papers by Stern, N. (1977) and
Pearce, D. and D. Ulph (1995), but it is not explained in detail why such empirical estimates
might at all be of much value for making ethical decisions. Ethically relevant arguments on
the choice of η, in principle, might be found in three different ways.
(i) Adopting an ethical perspective does not exclude that the ethical values of existing people
become the yardstick of evaluation. Then the debate is not about what seems to be just in the
eyes of an impartial and detached ethical observer but which altruistic attitudes are prevalent
in a society. This approach, which is in fact applied by Stern, N. (2007), combines prescriptive
and descriptive elements. The observed data do not come from the market-place but from
political decisions where ethical motivations on distributional issues manifest. Although
many political decisions (e.g. on pension reform and the size of the government deficit)
clearly affect distribution between generations, it is very difficult if not impossible to find out
the level of the inequality aversion η underlying just these decisions. Therefore, results from
empirical studies on quite different topics in public policy as e.g. tax policy are transferred
to the field of intergenerational distribution. The various studies on inequality aversion
as expressed by income tax progressivity in a society suggest different values for η which
sometimes lie in the interval between 1 and 2 (see Evans, D. (2005)) but are lower than 1 in
other studies (see Atkinson, A. and Brandolini, A. (2010)). These data certainly give some
hint at existing normative beliefs on inequality. But individual attitudes towards income
distribution within a society and in a certain period of time are multi-dimensional and also
include aspects of effort and merit which are absent in the intergenerational context (where
instead motivations as responsibility and stewardship play an important role). So it may
be doubted whether estimates for η that are obtained from income tax studies can easily be
applied to intergenerational evaluation and climate policy.
(ii)The ethical acceptability of different values of η can also be assessed by "thought
experiments" through which their implications in specific theoretical models are assessed
and, in the end, some "reflective equilibrium" (see at a general level Rawls, J. (1971) and with
specific application to intergenerational equity Asheim, G. B. (2010)) on distributional norms
might be achieved. In this vein Stern himself has conducted hypothetical "leaky bucket"
experiments focusing on the tolerable losses when income transfers from a rich to a poor
individual are made (see also Dietz, S. and Stern, N. (2008), p. 106). So e.g. if the giver were
five times as rich than the receiver this accepted loss would be 96 % for η = 2. But note that
for η = 1 this loss also amounts to heavy 80 % so that from this perspective Stern’s preference
for η = 1 is not really substantiated.
In his critique of the Stern Report Dasgupta, P. (2008) has instead examined which
consequences the choice of η = 1 has for the rate of optimal growth in a linear Ramsey
growth model where productivity of investment leads to an "incubation bucket" in the sense
of Schelling, T. C. (1995). Under otherwise plausible assumptions (but without exogenous
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technical progress) Dasgupta showed that η = 1 implies an extremely high savings rate
amounting to almost 100 % such that early generations would suffer extremely and a fair
intergenerational balance would not be come about. In this way the traditional oversaving
argument that usually is applied to disprove undiscounted utilitarianism is brought into play
again, now to make judgments about sensible values of η. Then higher levels of η (e.g.
η = 2 as proposed by Dasgupta, P. (2008) and other authors like Weitzman, M. (2007)) seem
to be appropriate, which entail more equal optimal consumption paths and protect earlier
generations from overburdening through excessive saving.
(iii) It is also possible to start from some explicitly formulated postulates (or "axioms")
which a social welfare function should fulfill. Such a property is "circumstance solidarity"
(Fleurbaey, M. (2008)) which in the context of growth theory means that no generation
should lose when the technological conditions improve, i.e. in the linear growth model
when productivity α increases. In order to satisfy this condition all values η < 1 have to
be excluded since with such a low inequality aversion the early generations would get lower
consumption in the optimal solution when the α grows (see Buchholz, W. and Schumacher, J.
(2010)). Therefore η = 1 turns out to be the minimum degree of inequality aversion which is
acceptable if circumstance solidarity is adopted as a normative postulate. In the framework of
such an axiomatic approach one can consider other ethical postulates, such as e.g. non-envy
criteria which are also familiar in ethical social choice theory. With this approach η = 1 results
when non-envy refers to absolute consumption levels of different generations. Alternatively,
η = 2 would be obtained if the non-envy comparison referred to relative consumption levels
(for details see again Buchholz, W. and Schumacher, J. (2010)).
Different values of η reflect value judgments on fair distributions, either at the level of
voters or at the level of an ethical observer. These value judgments unavoidably have a
subjective element such that it cannot be expected from the very beginning that a unique
and uncontroversial estimate for η is obtained. In spite of this general caveat, the thought
experiments desbribed above support the view that low degrees of inequality aversion with
values η < 1 do not conform to ethical intuition. Recent empirical studies on revealed ethical
preferences in tax policy give some support for this lower bound as most of them suggest
values for η lying somewhere between 1 and 2. Therefore, we can conclude that, from the
perspective of both theoretical as empirical ethics, Stern, N. (2007) works with an extremely
low degree of inequality aversion which gives the future (too) much weight.
Concerning an upper bound for η, things are less clear. No one in the debate around the Stern
Review seems to advocate a value of η beingmuch higher than 3. But, as with the "trio of twos"
from Weitzman, M. (2007), specific proposals for appropriate values of η mostly follow from
pure guesswork. Additional research therefore is required to find more precise foundations
for ethically motivated choices of the parameter η.
3.2 Pure time preference
Determination of pure utility time discount factors (δt)t=1,2,... is even more problematic than
of inequality aversion η. There are three approaches which - similar as in the case of η - either
refer to stated preferences of individuals or to normative ideas of an ethical observer.
(i) Aggregating opinions of more than 2000 economists Weitzman, M. (2001) obtained
discount rates not being constant but falling to zero over time. Specifically, he got a
discount rate of 4 % for the next 5 years as the "immediate future", then 3 % for the
subsequent years until year 25 from now, 2 % between year 26 and 75, 1 % between year
76 and 300 and, finally thereafter for the "far-distant future", the discount rate 0. But since
Weitzman’s study had the character of a black box and the motives of the respondents have
not been explored systematically, it does not become transparent what the elicited discount
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rates really express. In particular, it is left open whether the answers reflect pure time
preference as such or whether they are confounded by other aspects as inequality aversion
or predictions of future growth rates. The difficulties to isolate pure time preference as
a separate behavioral motive are well-known from the empirical literature on discounting
in every-day individual choices. Trying to control for these additional factors normally
leads to discount rates that are substantially lower than those originally inferred (see
Frederick, S., Loewenstein, G. and O’Donoghue, T. (2002)).
Another difficulty with Weitzman’s approach concerns his specific method to aggregate the
elicited time discount rates. To illustrate this problemwe consider a simple example, in which
there are two respondents a and b. Agent a has the constant time preference rate ρa = 0 such
that for that agent’s time discount factors δat = 1 holds for all periods t = 1, 2, . . . . Agent b
instead has the time preference rate ρb = 1 which implies δbt =
(
1
2
)t−1
in period t. Taking the
average of these both discount factors gives
δmt =
1
2
· 1+
1
2
·
(
1
2
)t−1
(12)
as discount factor for period t = 1, 2, . . . . Clearly, limt→∞ δ
m
t = 1 which implies that the
discount rates ρmt obtained from this averaging procedure converge to zero in the long run.
A similar result holds when there are not different opinions on time preference but when
discount rates are uncertain (Weitzman, M. (1998)). Our small theoretical exercise shows that
Weitzman’s main result, i.e. that costs and benefits accruing in the far-distant future should
be discounted at a very low and even at the lowest possible rate, does not so much rest upon
the collected opinions on appropriate discount rates. Rather it is a direct consequence of his
aggregation method which is not at all naturally given. So, alternatively, one could simply
average the different stated discount rates, which based on Weitzman’s data would give a
constant discount rate of about 4 % or consider - as suggested by Gollier, C. (2004) - the
average of future instead of present values. This would change the outcome totally since
then the far-distant future would have to be discounted not at the lowest but at the highest
possible rate. In any case it is required that the ideas, and possibly their normative content,
lying behind the different aggregation methods are explained and motivated carefully (see
Buchholz, W. and Schumacher, J. (2008) for some comparison of Weitzman’s and Gollier’s
aggregation methods and Gollier, C. (2010) for an attempt to reconcile both approaches).
Otherwise, the aggregation procedure appears to be arbitrary and its results thus only are
of limited value.
(ii) Assume that (as in the classical approach by Harsanyi, J. (1955)) there is an ethical
observer behind a veil of ignorance who applies expected utility theory to compare different
distributions across generations. If in this situation the "states of the world" will not occurwith
the same probability she will take these differences into account - even if, in principle, she is
impartial and does not favor any generation. Thus it may be ethically well acceptable to give
later generations some lower weight in social evaluation since there is some risk that mankind
(e.g. by an asteroid or by a devastating epidemic disease) is extinct. Later generations then
would not exist and thus were not able to enjoy the fruits of savings today. If this risk of
extinction from one period to the next is constant over time and equal to π the discount factor
in period t is the survival probability δt = (1 − π)
t−1. Estimation of π obviously is very
speculative and a matter of subjective belief. In particular, Stern, N. (2007) has assumed a
probability of 10 % that civilization may be extinct within one century which leads to the
annual utility discount rate ρ = 0.1% being used in the Stern Review. From a different ethical
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perspective one could, however, raise some doubts whether it is justified at all to make such a
bet on the existence of future generations.
(iii) If we return to the linear growth model described above it becomes clear that
non-decreasing and thus sustainable consumption paths emerge as optimal solutions if δα > 1
, i.e. δ > 1α or ρ < α − 1, which means that the time discount rate is lower than the
economy’s productivity. Growth of consumption along an optimal path is reduced if ρ is
increased. If δ = 1α or ρ = α − 1 a constant consumption path is obtained. Playing
around with ρ in this way means that the time discount rate which is considered to be
appropriate depends on the underlying technology and thus becomes endogenous. As in
Llavador, H., Silvestre, J. and J. Roemer (2008) the ethical objective then is some desirable
speed of growth which is also in line with Rawls, J. (1971) "just savings principle" and his
justification of pure time discount. A problem with this approach, however, is that the
familiar idea that time discount rates are part of fixed social preferences being independent
of the technological conditions has to be abandoned completely. But by adjusting the time
discounting to the productivity of capital at least gives some upper bound for the admissible
discount rate if a non-sustainable development is to be ensured.
4. Conclusion
If the choice of a specific intertemporal evaluation criterion is seen to be an ethical one,
which is the viewpoint taken in this article, an uncontroversial solution clearly does not
exist. Following M. Weber’s famous "Wertfreiheitspostulat" it can never be decided on an
objective scientific base what should be considered as an equitable distribution between
agents in general and among generations as an important special case. Nevertheless, our
considerations allow some tentative conclusions on the adequacy of intertemporal evaluation
criteria in climate change policy.
(i) Rejection of the undiscounted in favor of discounted utilitarianism, as often suggested
in the literature, seems neither necessary nor desirable. In the first place, undiscounted
utilitarianism implies equal treatment of all generations and ensures sustainability. These
are real virtues of an evaluative criterion. In the second place, it does not completely rule
out making choices among increasing consumption paths - in particular, the introduction
of pure time discount is not really required to avoid the excessive saving problem that
is typically attributed to undiscounted utilitarianism and, indeed, often seen as its major
shortcoming. Moreover, endorsement of undiscounted utilitarianism at a basic level need
not preclude the application of a - possibly very small - pure time discount rate in order to
account for the uncertainty of costs and benefits falling on future generations. Irrespective
of the level of the time discount rate such a kind of "discounted utilitarianism light"
gives numerical representability of the underlying social ordering which, from a practical
perspective, faciliates application of the evaluation criterion to cost-benefit analysis and, from
a theoretical perspective, ensures completeness of the social ordering and fulfillment of the
strong Pareto principle. Seen from such a pragmatic viewpoint the extensive discussion on
impossibility results in the case of infinitely many generations becomes a little redundant
and some doubts may arise to which degree the recently developed more complicated hybrid
criteria represent an improvement. So, partly for the same and partly for additional reasons
as put forward by Stern, N. (2007) himself, we are essentially backing Stern’s basic preference
for undiscounted utilitarianism which gives the ethical dimension of the problem due respect
and seems to represent a substantial shift of paradigm in the literature on intertemporal
evaluation.
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(ii) Concerning the parameters that specify the social welfare function we consequently accept
Stern’s choice of a very low pure time discount rate ρ but reject his choice of the inequality
aversion parameter η as too low. Various thought experiments conducted in growth theoretic
models as well as empirical observations of actual political decisions on redistribution suggest
values of η that are higher than 1 andmostly lie closer to 2 than to 1. By now, unfortunately, no
clear-cut normative criteria seem to be available which might help to determine more precise
values for η. Thus there is much room left for the choice of η. This suggests that in specific
applications sensitivity tests with different values of η are advisable. Employing some higher
level of η gives less weight to the future. In the context of climate policy this means that
the abatement of greenhouse gas emissions could happen more slowly than demanded by
Stern, N. (2007). Applying Stern’s approach but working with higher and more plausible
values of η, would help to approach the different positions and thus take much edge off the
heated controversy on the Stern Review and its urgent call for strong and immediate action in
climate change policy.
Even though he uses the descriptive approach on discounting, Nordhaus, W. (2007) makes
essentially the same point when he conducts a further run of his DICE integrated assessment
model with the same near zero pure time discount rate ρ as in the Stern Report but a much
higher elasticity of marginal utility η = 3. With these parameter values Nordhaus obtains
quite similar results as in his original calculations which had been based on ρ = 1.5% and
η = 2. In both simulations the "price of carbon" which equilibrates the marginal cost of
environmental damages with the marginal abatement costs would lie between 200 and 300 $
per ton of carbon by the end of this century. This price would be much lower than with Stern’s
original parameter choice where the price of carbon would rise steeply to almost 1000 $ which
makes the climate change problem appear much more dramatic. In his postscript to the Stern
Review, Stern, N. (2008) himself presents related results concerning the interchangeability
between η and ρ showing, e.g., that increase of η from 1 to 1.25 may have a similar effect on
the monetary costs of climate change as an increase of the pure time discount rate ρ from 0.1
% to 0.5 %.
These simulation studies on the costs and benefits of climate change policy thus confirm
a basic and empirically quite relevant message of this paper: The question whether to use
undiscounted or discounted utilitarianism is to some degree futile concerning practical policy
implications. What in the end matters muchmore is the selection of specific parameter values.
However, it is hard to provide some well-founded normative justification for the precise
values chosen.
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